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I. Introduction
The decentralised institutional scene in Spain has changed over the 
years. Since the autonomous communities were established in the ear-
ly eighties, formal reforms and political settlements have defi ned the 
structure and functioning principles of self-government. Simultane-
ously, and according to opinion polls, throughout this period Spanish 
citizens have had a very positive attitude towards decentralisation 
and have progressively internalised the basic aspects of the system. 
As a result, in 1998 the level of support and commitment that citizens 
expressed for the country’s decentralised structure reached similar 
levels to that expressed for democracy (Llera, 2002: 321-377; Mota, 
2008: 87-110). In the light of these data, it seemed that positive feel-
ings towards the system could be considered to be not only stable 
but also consolidated.
The author would like to thank Esther Martínez and Sandra Planes for their assistance in 
statistical matters; and also to two anonymous reviewers who suggested changes and 
ideas that have contributed to improve this piece of work.
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However, further developments have shown that this stability 
was not structural. In early 2000 a wave of institutional reforms of self-
government was carried out provoking intense social and political de-
bate. Leaving aside the failed reform of the Basque Country’s Statute of 
Autonomy (2004), much controversy was aroused in 2004 by the pro-
cess that eventually led to the passing of the reform of Catalonia’s Stat-
ute of Autonomy in 2006. Perceived by some as an illegitimate instru-
ment designed to introduce major changes into the political structure 
of the whole country and, by others, as a legitimate tool to qualita-
tively improve and explicitly defi ne the political nature of self-govern-
ment, the fact is that the terms and nature of the reform of Catalonia’s 
Statute were not just confi ned to Catalonia but also affected other au-
tonomous communities. The Catalan reform gave fresh impetus to the 
political need to carry out reforms in other autonomous communities, 
which wholly or partially inspired the contents of these reforms, and 
fed a heated debate on the territorial issue at both political and social 
levels. Whether or not these reforms had a direct impact on public 
opinion, the fact is that simultaneously with the reforms, opinion polls 
revealed a number of changes in both the intensity and direction of 
long-term trends in the levels of support that citizens had hitherto giv-
en to the Spanish model of political decentralisation. In 2010, these 
changes were confi rmed at both Spanish-wide and autonomous-com-
munity levels: support for further decentralisation contracted and sup-
port for centralism and for a milder decentralisation grew, although 
this picture differed across the different autonomous communities, 
showing three distinctive groups: the group of autonomous communi-
ties dissatisfi ed with the current model and aiming at moving further in 
the decentralisation process; the group of autonomous communities 
satisfi ed with the current model; and the group of autonomous com-
munities in which support for a regression in the current model of de-
centralisation (moving towards a model in which the autonomous com-
munities would have fewer powers or, even, a centralist model) has 
become the fi rst preference or is showing an upward trend.
In general terms, the objective of this arti cle is to contextualise 
changes in citizens’ perceptions between 1992 and 2010 for each auton-
omous community and in the light of the wave of reforms initiated in 
2003 and according to the evolution of the different autonomous-
community patterns.
In order to do so, the article has been divided into four sections. 
The fi rst section will describe the context of the reforms; the second will 
show the long-term trends of what can be regarded as citizens’ political 
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attitudes towards the territorial model of political decentralisation. This 
description will be based on the chronological evolution of opinion poll 
data relating to preferences for the territorial model and will provide a 
picture of Spain as a whole. The data have been taken from surveys car-
ried out by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas –CIS– (Centre of 
Sociological Research) from the early 1980s to the present. Once the 
main trends and changes have been described, the third section will 
analyse these changes at autonomous-community level by seeking to 
identify different patterns of change. In other words, the main focus 
will be on identifying changes and whether or not they have followed 
similar patterns in the different autonomous communities.
1. Self-Government Reforms: An Overview
In 2004 the Basque Parliament approved a proposal to reform the Basque 
Country’s Statute of Autonomy. The reform, spurred on by the then 
Basque nationalist premier, laid out a plan for a confederal relation-
ship between the autonomous community and Spain. The proposal 
was, however, unsuccessful. Like any reform of a statute of autonomy, 
although formally initiated and proposed by the autonomous com-
munity’s parliament, it had to be submitted to the Spanish Parliament 
for approval. The Basque proposal was fi rmly rejected at that initial 
stage of submission. However, from a political perspective, it consti-
tuted the fi rst step towards a new phase of self-government reforms.
Self-government reforms had been carried out before 2004, but 
one of the main differences between the earlier reforms and the later 
ones concerns who promoted them. While reforms prior to 2004 had 
been promoted and largely controlled by the central government with 
the support of both the party in offi ce and the main opposition (state-
wide parties), from 2004 the reforms clearly had their origins in the au-
tonomous communities (Viver, 2010). Whether elite-initiated or enjoying 
a degree of social support, the fact is that the impetus for the new peri-
od of reforms originated at autonomous-community level was tolerated, 
though to a certain extent, by the central government and institutions.
Prior to 2004, however, self-government reforms had been re-
lated to the implementation and deployment of the political agree-
ment reached between the central government and the opposition: 
the 1992 Agreement (Pactos Autonómicos). The then Socialist govern-
ment agreed with the opposition party, the conservative People’s Par-
ty (Partido Popular, PP), regarding the constitutional path to be fol-
189
Self-Government Reforms and Public Support for Spain’s Territorial Model
REAF núm 13, abril 2011, p. 186-214
lowed by most of the autonomous communities in order to attain 
higher levels of powers. In other words, the agreement was designed 
to control the timing and the process by which the autonomous com-
munities would acquire greater powers. It applied to the 13 autono-
mous communities that had been created after 1981 and which were 
required to follow the slow-track process of empowerment. Of course, 
although the process was largely controlled from the centre, each au-
tonomous community had formally to initiate the reform of their re-
spective statutes of autonomy in order to include the new powers. 
Between 1992 and 1999, therefore, these autonomous communities 
were encouraged to reform their statutes. In essence, this consisted in 
assuming new powers. As a result, at the end of the 1990s and as a 
result of these top-down reforms, the statutes of autonomy of all the 
autonomous communities formally reached similar levels of powers.1
Apart from these centrally-induced self-government reforms 
linked to the distribution of powers, two-fold signifi cant reforms af-
fecting the autonomous communities took place in 1993 and 1996: the 
reforms of the fi nancing system of the autonomous communities that 
were addressed to increase the autonomous-community margin of 
fi scal accountability and, consequently, to reduce the large level of fi scal 
(and thus, political) dependence that the autonomous communities 
have on central government.
To the matters of this article, a crucial aspect characterises the 
reforms of the fi nancing system and distinguishes them from the sec-
ond wave of self-government reforms: the fi nancing system was not 
understood as a self-government issue but as a state-wide issue and, 
therefore, although the reforms were formally spurred by the auton-
omous communities, the arenas in which negotiations took place 
were intergovernmental (within the multilateral intergovernmental 
forum on autonomous-community fi scal and fi nancing committee - 
Consejo de Política Fiscal y Financiera) and state-wide parliamentary, 
that is, within the Spanish Parliament (when reforms implied a legis-
lative change, i.e. in 1996).2 To put it simpler, since its establishment 
1. There are a large number of works dealing with this period. Among them Hernández 
and González, 1993. For an overview of the whole period, see Aja 1999.
2. Reforms of the fi nancing system resulted from post-electoral agreements concluded 
by the Spanish Socialists in 1993, and by the People’s Party in 1996 with the then party 
in offi ce in Catalonia, Convergència i Unió (CiU). Beyond post-electoral events and nego-
tiations, the point to be highlighted here is that although it was the party in offi ce in the 
Catalan government, a Catalan nationalist party, that pushed the reform to the Spanish 
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in the early 1980, the fi nancing of the autonomous communities had 
been institutionally defi ned and settled as a state-wide and not a 
self-government issue. However, that the fi nancing of the autono-
mous communities should also be defi ned and mainly understood 
from a self-government perspective, was one of the key issues of the 
second wave of reforms: the reforms promoted from the autono-
mous communities were addressed to reform, individually and ac-
cording to their respective defi nition of problems and demands, the 
basic norms of self-government: the statutes of autonomy.
From a purely chronological perspective the fi rst proposal of 
the second wave of institutional reforms was, as mentioned above, 
that of the Basque Country (2004). It was followed by those of Cata-
governmental agenda, the reform of the fi nancing system had been high on the agenda 
of the autonomous communities long before. In other words, the electoral results just 
opened a window of opportunity and the autonomous communities, led by the Catalan 
government, took advantage of it and brought about a state-wide change. See Monas-
terio et al. (1993); and Models and Puy (1996).
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Table 1. Second Wave of Self-Government Reforms (2004-2010). Chronology
Passing of the Proposal 
for Reform (Autonomous 
Community’s Parliament)
Passing of the Reform 
(Spanish Lower 
Chamber)
Ratifi cation 
through 
Referendum 
Basque Country 30.12.2004 Rejected: 01.02.20051
Valencian Community 01.07.2005 09.02. 2006 —
Catalonia 30.09.2005 31.03.2006 18.06.2006
Andalusia 02.05.2006 02.11.2006 18.02.2007
Balearic Islands 13.06.2006 21.12.2006 —
Aragon 21.06.2006 15.03.2007 —
Canary Islands 13.09.2006 Withdrawn2 —
Castile and León 29.11.2006 30.10.2007 —
Castilla-La Mancha 29.01.2007 Withdrawn3 —
Extremadura 10.09.2009 In progress —
Navarre 21.06.2010 30.09.2010 —
Source: Compiled by the author from parliamentary proceedings.
1 The proposal was submitted to the Spanish Lower Chamber which rejected it by overall majority 
in February 2005. 
2 In 2008, the Parliament of the Canary Islands formally asked to withdraw its proposal from the 
Spanish Parliament.
3 In 2010, the Parliament of Castilla-La Mancha asked to withdraw its proposal from the Spanish 
Parliament.
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lonia and the Valencian Community (2005), Andalusia, the Balearic 
Islands, Aragon, the Canary Islands, Castile and León (2006), Castilla-
La Mancha (2007), Extremadura (2008) and Navarre (2009), and two 
of them, those of the Canary Islands and Castilla-La Mancha were 
withdrawn by their respective autonomous parliaments (see Table 1).
As mentioned above, the crucial difference between these re-
forms and those carried out in the fi rst wave is the fact that they 
were instigated at autonomous-community level, although there 
were fundamental differences with regard to the amount of social 
support they enjoyed. While some reforms had the support of the 
citizenry, others were promoted principally by their respective politi-
cal elites, who took advantage of this window of opportunity but 
lacked both the explicit and implicit support and even the interest of 
their citizens. In this respect and in order to show the most extreme 
examples, in 2005, when asked whether it was necessary to reform 
the statute of autonomy, 65% of Catalan citizens thought this was 
Self-Government Reforms and Public Support for Spain’s Territorial Model
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Figure 1. Perceptions of the Need to Reform the Statutes of Autonomy (%) 2005
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necessary, while only 18% of the citizens of Castilla-La Mancha were 
of a similar opinion (see Figure 1).3
Leaving aside the Basque case because of the content of the re-
form – designed to establish a confederal relationship with Spain – 
and the particular contextual and structural situation of the Basque 
Country in relation to central institutions,4 it can be said that unlike 
the fi rst wave of centrally-induced reforms, the acquisition of more 
powers by the autonomous communities was far from being the only 
issue. However, although some reforms were aimed mainly at enlarg-
ing and updating the contents of powers, the crucial and most con-
troversial issue was related to another novel objective established 
and introduced by Catalonia’s reform: the establishment of legal 
mechanisms designed to improve the quality of self-government. 
These mechanisms were basically designed to prevent central govern-
ment from intruding into the exclusive powers of the autonomous 
communities, to establish the participation of Catalonia within state-
wide institutions, and to provide a degree of fi nancial suffi ciency; 
that is, the fi nancing issue was included in the pack of the self-gov-
ernment reform.5 At stake, therefore, was the political meaning of 
self-government itself in relation to central institutions, and, above 
all, how this should be established legally.
Disagreements regarding the defi nition of the meaning of self-
government and the means used to legally establish such a defi nition 
were at the core of the heated and intensely political legal and social 
debate that arose immediately after the very fi rst step was taken in 
that direction by the leading actors, the institutions of Catalan self-
government. Whether any reform, and especially a Catalan-type re-
form, should lead to a new phase in the development of decentralisa-
tion in Spain, and whether this was positive or negative were the 
main issues of the social debate. Simultaneously, opinion polls showed 
some changes in the long-established patterns of citizens’ views of 
the system. Whether and to what extent reforms and their debates 
had a contextual impact upon citizens’ views of the system is certain-
ly a question that arises when one has a look at the evolution of citi-
zens’ views of the institutional system. I now turn to it.
3. Data from survey # 2610 (CIS).
4. I refer here to issues relating to terrorism and fi scal independence.
5. See Viver i Pi-Sunyer forthcoming. For details on the process to reform Catalonia’s 
statute in English, see Colino, 2009; and Keating and Wilson, 2009.
193
Self-Government Reforms and Public Support for Spain’s Territorial Model
REAF núm 13, abril 2011, p. 186-214
2. Evolution of Preferences Regarding the Territorial 
Model: A Spain-wide Perspective
Over the last twenty years, the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas 
(CIS) has systematically carried out opinion polls regarding different 
aspects of the development of political decentralisation. Among oth-
er issues, the CIS surveys have attempted to provide evidence of citi-
zens’ support for the Spanish model of political decentralisation as a 
whole, on the perceptions of the impact of the different levels of 
government on their daily life, and on the attachment that citizens 
feel toward their respective autonomous governments. One of the 
questions that has been asked refers to citizens’ preferences regard-
ing the model of territorial organisation. This question has appeared 
in most Spain-wide surveys since the early 1980s, which means that 
fi gures for Spain as a whole are available dating back to this time. 
Representative samples at autonomous-community level were not 
systematically available before 1992. At that time, the CIS initiated a 
set of polls that have since been conducted simultaneously in all 17 
autonomous communities; today these polls are known as the “au-
tonomous-community barometer” (Barómetro Autonómico) and 
have been carried out on fi ve occasions: in 1992, 1998, 2002, 2005 
and 2010.6 Between 1992 and 2005 the question proposed four alter-
native models for organising political power: 1) a centralist political 
system; 2) a political system with autonomous communities “as they 
are”; 3) a system in which the autonomous communities would have 
higher levels of power; and 4) a system where the autonomous com-
munities would become independent states. In 2010, in addition to 
these four alternative models, a fi fth model was included in the ques-
tionnaire: a decentralised political system based upon autonomous 
communities, but with fewer powers than at present. As we will see, 
this new inclusion radically altered existing patterns, although at the 
same time it might also reveal some hitherto hidden or possibly new-
ly-acquired aspects of citizens’ views on political decentralisation. The 
analysis of the evolution of this question between 1992 and 2010 will 
form the basis of this section, fi rstly at a Spain-wide level and sec-
ondly at autonomous-community level.
6. Reference for 1992 surveys:# to #2025-2041; reference for 1998: 2286; reference for 
2002: 2555; reference for 2005: 2610; reference for 2010: 2829.
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Figure 2 shows the evolution of citizens’ preferences regard-
ing the model of territorial organisation of power between 1984 and 
2010; it gives Spain-wide fi gures, that is, taking Spain as a whole.8 
The most important trends are the following:
Although the starting point (1984) of citizens’ preferences for a 
centralist system and for the then recently established system of au-
tonomous communities were very similar (each receiving around 30% 
of citizens’ support), the two options developed in opposite direc-
tions: support for a model like the current one with autonomous 
communities (status quo model) was the only preference that kept 
growing until 2008. In contrast, the option for a centralist system 
7. Data for 1984 from survey #1441; for 1988, survey #1773; for 1990: #1908; for 1994: 
#2286; for 2002: #2455; for 2005: # 2619; for 2007: # 2667; for 2008: #2757; for 2010: 
2829.
8. When interpreting Figure 1, one should bear in mind that changes in 2010 are largely 
the result of the impact of the inclusion of a new fi fth alternative model in the ques-
tionnaire.
Figure 2. Evolution of Preferences Regarding the Model of Territorial Organisation 
(1984-2010) Spain-wide fi gures (%)
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kept declining; in 2005 it reached its lowest level ever (8.7%) and 
then initiated a notable recovery: 11.2% in 2007 and 14.1% in 2010. 
As for the minority secessionist option, this has remained relatively 
stable at around 7%.
Between 2008 and 2010 support for the status quo option de-
creased dramatically, losing around 13% of popular support, from 
55.5% to 42.4%. The fundamental cause for this contraction is re-
lated to the transfer of support from the status quo to the new 
model included from 2010 in the questionnaire (fewer powers to 
the autonomous communities). However, two, probably inter-
twined, reasons may account for such a transfer: fi rst of all, transfers 
can be related to a better accommodation of people’s views in this 
new questionnaire. Thus, one could assume that part of the previ-
ous support for the status quo was rather a second-best option that 
sincere support; in this sense, it can be said that the introduction of 
the new model revealed a hidden trend: that of people’s support 
for a milder model of decentralisation that was, nevertheless, differ-
ent to pure centralism. Secondly, transfers can also be related to 
consequences of the political context on people’s views. From this 
perspective one could assume that to some citizens that would have 
previously given their support to the status quo, reforms would have 
brought about a change in the system. Consequently, the new sta-
tus quo would no longer refl ect their preferences. In this respect, 
their preferences would probably be better accommodated in the 
option for a decentralised system where the autonomous communi-
ties had fewer powers. For others, the reforms would have brought 
into question the basic attitudes of political decentralisation and, as 
a consequence, may have changed their overall view of the system. 
What had hitherto been considered to be a positive aspect became 
a negative one. Thus, from this perspective, depending on how much 
reforms would had changed their perceptions and basic attitudes to 
the system, citizens would have transferred their preferences either 
to a milder version of decentralisation (autonomous communities, 
but with fewer powers) or to a radical change: the centralist option. 
This change in perceptions may be related to the rise in the latter op-
tion since 2007, before the introduction of the new model into the 
questionnaire.
Finally, the option for a political model based on the autono-
mous communities holding greater powers (status-quo-plus), displays 
an interesting evolution which seems to be the most highly infl u-
enced by the political mood. Let us try to explain it.
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As one can see, support for granting greater powers to the au-
tonomous communities remained very stable between 1984 and 1996 
at around 20% of the population. It is interesting to note that 1996 
was the last time that the central government extended the powers 
of the autonomous communities (the last top-down reform) and 
when reforms of the fi nancing system took place. Between 1996 and 
2005, the percentage of support for the status-quo-plus option in-
creased signifi cantly reaching almost 30%, but in 2007 the level of 
support for this option decreased to the same levels as in the early 
1990s. The fact that this variation happened simultaneously with the 
take-off of the reforms raises a relevant question: to what extent re-
forms had an impact upon Spanish public opinion.
As a matter of fact, Figure 2 shows that changes in the recent 
evolution of support are in all but one case (preference for status 
quo) previous to 2010; that is, data suggest that changes although 
related to the questionnaire, may also be linked to the political con-
text. Thus, after all it could be said that including a new model in 
the questionnaire contributed to a better understanding of some 
already existing timid changes in trends. Looking only at Spain-wide 
fi gures, it seems that despite being questioned, the status quo is 
still the preferred option among Spaniards, and that the second 
most popular option, that of deepening the level of political decen-
tralisation (status-quo-plus), received more support when it was 
just a political expectation; as soon as it became a reality its popu-
larity diminished and did so before any change in the questionnaire. 
But did it decrease everywhere? To what extent do these Spain-
wide trends correspond to the different political expectations exist-
ing within the country? And, even more importantly, to what ex-
tent could the existence of different autonomous-community trends 
featuring the people’s views of the system also be taken as factors 
that infl uenced the direction and intensity of the possible impacts 
that reforms had upon citizens’ support of status quo? Although 
this article does not aim at testing such hypothesis, it does aim at 
showing that the changes in public opinion that accompanied the 
processes of self-government reform in each autonomous commu-
nity seem to be quite consistent with the long-term patterns of peo-
ple’s support for both status quo and further decentralisation. In 
other words, to some extent data seem to suggest that from 2005, 
changes in each autonomous community followed a previous path. 
This is where the description turns from general perspectives to the 
autonomous communities.
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3. Evolution of Preferences Regarding the Territorial 
Model: A Perspective from the Autonomous 
Communities
Since the aim here is to identify changes during and after the recent 
bottom-up reforms, it seems appropriate to divide the 1992-2010 pe-
riod into three sub-periods: 1992-2002: the pre-reform period, 2002-
2005: the initial period of reforms and 2005-2010: the period of devel-
opment of the reforms. Although the 1992-2002 period might seem 
too long compared to the length of the other two, it is also true that 
the 1992-2002 period was above all a very stable period not just at the 
Spain-wide level but also for each autonomous community. The objec-
tive is, therefore, to explore for each period how different (or similar) 
the autonomous communities have been from the Spanish pattern, 
and to analyse these patterns for the whole length of time and, thus, 
contextualise changes.9
For each period a table will show the most signifi cant reference 
points for each period: Spanish average means,10 Spanish average rate 
of growth for each preference, the extreme values (maximum and min-
imum values) and the difference between these two. The two Spanish 
averages provide two different points of reference, that of the degree 
of support in relation to the Spain-wide model and that of the aver-
age direction of trends; the maximum and minimum values and their 
distance provide a simple picture of the extreme differences that exist 
between autonomous communities. These three tables, together with 
Table B (differentials for each autonomous community with respect to 
the Spanish averages) and C (rates of growth for each autonomous 
community) of the Appendices are the elements used here to group 
the autonomous communities and identify patterns of change and 
stability in the temporal evolution of the support for territorial or-
ganisation in autonomous communities.
9. The analysis of the evolution of preferences regarding the territorial model in all the 
autonomous communities will be based on two parameters: the differences in average 
means with respect to Spain-wide ones for three different periods of analysis (1992-
2002; 2002-2005 and 2005-2010), and the rates of growth for each preference in each of 
the above-mentioned periods (see Tables A and B in the Appendix). The analysis of the 
different means is designed to depict the autonomous communities in relation to Spain 
as a whole and to identify patterns of evolution over the three periods. The rates of 
growth will indicate the direction of changes within each autonomous community.
10. Table 2, Table 3 and Table 4. Sources of these tables: Tables A, B and C in the Appendices.
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3.1. Starting Point: the Pre-reform Period (1992-2002)
Table 2. Main Features of the 1992-2002 Period
 
Spanish 
average (%)
Maximum 
Average
Minimum 
Average
Differential 
max-min
Average 
Rates of 
Growth
Centralism 12.3 21.7(Murcia)
3.7
(Basque Country) 18 -32.58%
Status Quo 44.4 53.1(Valencian C.)
29.9
(Aragon) 23.2 22.25
Status Quo Plus 24.1 32.9(Aragon)
15.3
(Murcia) 27.6 21.39
Secessionism 6.5 19.5(Basque Country)
0.9
(Asturias) 18.6 -6.5
No answer 12 23.3(Asturias) 
6.6
(Valencian C.) 15.7 -39.5
Table 2 shows the main features of the 1992-2002 period, a long 
period characterised by two main trends (see Figure 2): the constant 
growth and consolidation of the status quo option at very high levels 
of support, the stability and slight increase in support for status-quo-
plus, and the relatively constant decrease in support for centralism. 
On average, though, centralism displayed a downward trend. Support 
for the status quo displayed an upward trend, at a rate of 22%. Sta-
tus-quo-plus includes almost a quarter of the population and displays 
a positive rate of growth (+21.4). The average support for secession 
(6.5%) conceals the high levels of the Basque Country (19%) and of 
the other two autonomous communities that chose this option. For the 
rest, the scoring was generally insignifi cant.
Regarding the distribution of each autonomous community,11 two 
main groups can be distinguished for the 1992-2002 period: 1) auton-
omous communities where the status quo is not the fi rst preference 
and which aim at increasing their level of self-government; 2) autono-
mous communities satisfi ed with the status quo and mostly in favour 
of no changes in any direction.
The fi rst group included the autonomous communities that reg-
istered low average levels of support for the status quo and high lev-
els of support for deepening decentralisation. In short, they are au-
11. See Table 3 in the Appendices.
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tonomous communities that preferred further extension of the 
decentralisation process. It included the Basque Country, Catalonia, 
the Canary Islands, the Balearic Islands and Aragon. It must be high-
lighted that all of them initiated, in the 2002-2005 period, a process 
to reform their respective statutes of autonomy.
Within this group, the Basque Country and Catalonia stand out 
as the most coherent patterns: apart from displaying the lowest lev-
els of support for the status quo and displaying a trend towards the 
decrease of this option, they also reject any backward steps in decen-
tralisation (low levels of centralism and regression) and display the 
highest scores in support of deepening decentralisation (upward 
trend) and secession. The other autonomous communities do not dis-
play the same degree of coherence and their characteristics need 
some explanation: the Canary and Balearic Islands both score very 
high in status-quo-plus and their support for centralism is certainly 
lower than the Spanish average; the differences between them are 
related to the intensity of the support for the status quo (much low-
er in the Balearic Islands) and in the direction of support for status-
quo-minus and secession: while the Balearic Islands display a slightly 
higher degree of support for secession with respect to the Spanish 
average, the Canary Islands show a slightly lower level of support. 
Aragon is a rather unusual case: apparently its scores in some prefer-
ences (one of the weakest supporters for the status quo option and 
one of the strongest supporters for status-quo-plus) do not appear 
to match its very high levels of support for centralism. Such apparent 
incoherence may have something to do with a two-fold dissatisfac-
tion with the status quo: on the one hand, dissatisfaction because of 
its limitations with respect to self-government, and on the other, dis-
satisfaction because the status quo is perceived to go too far. In oth-
er words, Aragon’s apparently incoherent scoring may be related to 
a quite divided society with regard to preferences for the model of 
territorial decentralisation: Aragonese people were dissatisfi ed with 
the status quo but for two rather different reasons and aiming at 
two different objectives.
The second group included two types of autonomous commu-
nities: the autonomous communities that were highly satisfi ed with 
the “status quo” but relatively open to changes designed to increase 
levels of self-government (Castile and León, Asturias, Galicia, Andalu-
sia, Cantabria, Extremadura, Castilla-La Mancha and the Valencian 
Community), and the autonomous communities (Murcia, Madrid and 
La Rioja) that despite being satisfi ed with the status quo were slight-
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ly less in favour of changes in the direction of self-government since 
they went in the opposite direction to the average Spanish trend: 
they displayed negative rates of increase for status-quo-plus.
Navarre is a case that does not fi t into any group. It scores high 
in the status quo (support for which continues to grow), registers a 
medium-high level in status-quo-plus (a downward trend), displays 
low levels of centralism (which continues to decrease) and scores 
high in secession. In other words, Navarre’s scores and trends show 
that its society is divided into two sectors: the sector of citizens that 
are fully satisfi ed with the status quo (which, it must be said, is char-
acterised by a somewhat greater degree of self-government than 
that of the other autonomous communities with the exception of the 
Basque Country) and the sector that radically rejects the model and 
supports secession.
3.2. The First Steps in the Reforms: Period 2002-2005
Table 3. Main Features of the 2002-2005 Period
 
Spanish 
average (%)
Maximum 
Average
Minimum 
Average
Differential 
max-min
Average 
Rates of 
Growth
Centralism 8.7 17.6 (Aragon)
2.3 
(Basque Country) 15.3 -5.43
Status Quo 51.4 74.5(Extremadura)
23.5 
(Catalonia) 51 +6.86
Status Quo Plus 26.3 48 (Catalonia)
11.5 
(Extremadura) 56.5 -0.75
Secessionism 6.6 29.2 (Basque Country)
0.2 
(Castile and León) 29 +4.76
No answer 7.1 11.6 (Andalusia)
2.9 
(Extremadura) 8.7 -2.9
This period is the one during which self-government reforms 
started. With respect to the previous period, the 2002-2005 period 
was, at the Spain-wide level, a period of apparent consolidation of 
the status quo as the most popular option: support reached 51.4% 
and continued to grow. Thus, in a way, it seems that there was a 
strengthening of the conviction that it was the “best” option. How-
ever, it is also true that the distance between extreme fi gures in-
creased dramatically: while in the previous period the distance was 
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23 percentage points (between 53.1 and 29.9), in this period the dis-
tance doubled to 51 points, with Extremadura as the most enthusi-
astic supporter of the status quo (74.5% of citizens) and Catalonia 
the least enthusiastic (23.5%), both extremes represent an increase 
with respect to the previous period. Therefore, as Figure 1 showed 
for Spain as a whole, data for 2002-2005 period suggest that the au-
tonomous communities chose to move in opposite directions: to-
wards the strengthening of the status quo (the majority) and towards 
its weakening (the minority). Similarly, status-quo-plus, despite scor-
ing slightly higher than in the previous period, showed signs of re-
cession: its rates of growth were negative. In other words, changes 
occurred and in two opposite directions: in some autonomous com-
munities support for status-quo-plus decreased while in others it in-
creased dramatically. Another indicator of changes during the peri-
od is the increasing popularity of secession, above all because 
secession is an option that is concentrated in three autonomous com-
munities (Basque Country, Catalonia and Navarre); in other words, 
preference for secession grew so signifi cantly in these autonomous 
communities that it was enough to compensate for the stable and 
even negative rates of growth registered in the remaining autono-
mous communities.
Accordingly, two groups can be distinguished and although 
they basically embrace the same autonomous communities and fea-
tures that composed and depicted the two groups in the previous 
period, they differ in the intensity of their respective trends: a grow-
ing negative attitude towards the status-quo (as for the group of 
autonomous communities dissatisfi ed with the status-quo) and the 
strengthening of the status-quo and a growing negative attitude to-
wards any change implying further decentralisation (as for the group 
of autonomous communities satisfi ed with the status-quo). The fi rst 
group included Catalonia, Basque Country, Aragon12 and the Balearic 
Islands; the second one included the remaining fourteen, of course, 
showing internal differences basically rooted in the levels of support 
and positive taxes of growth for centralism: the Canary Islands, Astu-
rias, Extremadura, Castile and León, Cantabria and Galicia showed no 
12. As in the previous period, Aragon showed its apparently contradictory features due 
to its double root of dissatisfaction with the status quo, although as a difference, dis-
satisfaction rooted in frustrated demands of self-government seemed to have reached 
its peak and give signs of recession with negative rates of growth for status quo plus, 
as mentioned before.
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signifi cant trends towards centralism while Castilla-La Mancha, Anda-
lusia, Madrid and Murcia did show them.13
To sum up, it seems quite clear that a number of changes took 
place during the 2002-2005 period. In the majority of autonomous 
communities these changes affected support for the status quo (which 
increased dramatically) and for status-quo-plus (which decreased). In 
this respect, it could be said that self-government reforms, apart 
from not being perceived as necessary by citizens, may have strength-
ened citizens’ attachment to the status quo and the rejection of fur-
thering the development of self-government. Support for centralism 
grew but not radically and not everywhere.
In Catalonia, the Basque Country, the Balearic Islands and Ara-
gon, changes in territorial preferences showed a radically different 
trend and referred to status quo. In Catalonia, the Basque Country 
and the Balearic Islands, dissatisfaction with the status quo dropped 
to early-1980s levels and in the Catalan case support for status-quo-
plus became the majority option, showing the expectations Catalans 
had regarding the reform of their statute. In Aragon, the data seem 
to indicate that the numbers of those who were dissatisfi ed with the 
status quo due to its limitations with regard to self-government tend-
ed to diminish (negative rates of growth for status-quo-plus), which 
could be interpreted as satisfaction with the steps taken to reform 
the Aragon statute of autonomy.
3.3. The 2005-2010 Period and Conclusions
Table 4. Main Features of the 2005-2010 Period
 
Spanish 
average (%)
Maximum 
Average
Minimum 
Average
Differential 
max-min
Average 
Rates of 
growth
Centralism 14.1 1.8 (Aragon)
24.8 
(Basque Country) 23 62.07
Status Quo Minus 11.2 Asturias (18.5) Navarre (4.3) 14.2 —
Status Quo 42.4 56.1 (Murcia)
26.3 
(Catalonia) 29.8 -17.51
13. Although it must be taken into account that positive rates of growth in centralism do 
not refl ect the differences in the departing points: in Andalusia support for centralism 
was far below the Spanish average, so any increase impacted heavily on its rates of growth.
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Status Quo Plus 16.6 29.7 (Balearic Islands)
6.6 
(Madrid) 23.1 -36.88
Secessionism 6.5 23.6 (Catalonia)
0.3 
(Aragon) 23.3 -1.52
No answer 9.3
12.5 
(Cantabria)
4.9 
(Canary Islands)
7.6 30.99
During this period most of the processes to reform the statutes 
were completed. In 2006, four reforms were passed, those of the Va-
lencian, Catalan, Andalusian and Balearic Islands statutes. In summer 
2006 Catalonia’s Statute of Autonomy was fi nally passed by the Span-
ish Parliament and ratifi ed by the Catalans through referendum. The 
resulting statute did not satisfy either those who had put great expec-
tations in it as an instrument to move forward in the process of decen-
tralisation or those who thought that the reform was going too far 
and wished to change the nature of the whole institutional system. 
Dissatisfaction due to the limited nature of the statute of autonomy 
was shown in the low levels of turnout in its referendum: only 48.85% 
of people on the electoral roll voted. As a result, in Catalonia seces-
sionist options increased dramatically, support for status-quo-plus 
clearly diminished and centralist preferences returned to the levels of 
the 1980s. Dissatisfaction with the perceived dangers of the statute 
was mainly shown in the Spain-wide media and politics and, above all, 
in the reaction of conservative forces: the Spain-wide opposition par-
ty, the Partido Popular, challenged the constitutionality of Catalonia’s 
statute in the Constitutional Court. In the other autonomous commu-
nities, the effects of the Catalan statute were, in some cases, accom-
panied by their own processes of self-government reform: Aragon, 
the Canary Islands, Castile and León, Castilla-La Mancha, Extremadura 
and Navarre. In the Canary Islands, disagreements between the two 
major Spain-wide parties over electoral aspects of the proposal to re-
form the Canary Islands’ statute brought about the complete failure 
of the reform process and its abandonment; yet it should be remem-
bered that in the Canary Islands support for the reform reached 42.5% 
of the population in 2005 (much higher than the average), thus imply-
ing the existence of a certain level of frustration among citizens.
Table 4 illustrates the turmoil surrounding self-government. First 
of all, the table includes the new territorial organisation option intro-
duced by the CIS, that of a status quo system characterised by a reduc-
tion in the powers of the autonomous communities, what I call “sta-
tus-quo-minus”. In itself, the introduction of this new option reveals 
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the change of perception regarding the developments the system has 
undergone and the need to understand them, especially with respect 
to changes in the status quo. Thus, secondly, the table shows that sup-
port for the status quo dropped by almost 10%, mostly, probably, as 
a result of the transfers to status-quo-minus. Thirdly, support for sta-
tus-quo-plus diminishes signifi cantly and even more striking is the 
closing of the gap between extremes within this option: while in the 
2002-2005 period this gap was more than 56 points, in this period it 
decreased to 23.1 points. There might be two reasons for this fall: in 
some autonomous communities it may be related to the rejection of 
self-government reforms due to their perceived negative effects on 
the system as a whole, and in some others it may be based on frustra-
tion and disappointment with the unfulfi lled hopes for reform. In this 
sense, it must be pointed out that while in the 2002-2005 period Cata-
lonia was displaying very high levels of support for status-quo-plus 
(48%), in this period support dropped to 29.3%.
Figure 3. Support for Territorial Options (%). 2010
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In such a context, Figure 3 allows three groups of autonomous 
communities to be distinguished: fi rst of all, the group of autono-
mous communities in which “further decentralisation” is the most 
preferred option implying, thus a dissatisfaction towards status quo 
(Catalonia, Basque Country and to a certain extent, the Balearic Is-
lands); secondly the group of autonomous communities composed of 
those autonomous communities where, in spite of everything, sup-
port for the status quo option remained high, although lower than in 
the previous period. That is, this is the pro-status quo group: the Ca-
nary Islands, La Rioja, Galicia, Extremadura, Navarre, Andalusia and 
Murcia. Four of them initiated a process of self-government reform 
(the Canary Islands, Extremadura, Andalusia and Navarre). What they 
have in common is the predominance of support for the status quo 
displayed in the distribution of support, and their differences result 
above all from the respective weight of support for regression and less 
signifi cantly from their support for further decentralisation.
A third group is composed of these autonomous communities 
that seem to be questioning the status quo and considering backward 
steps in the decentralisation system as a possible alternative: Aragon, 
Cantabria, Castile and León, Madrid, the Valencian Community, Astu-
rias and Castilla-La Mancha. These autonomous communities have in 
common their low scores in status quo (in all but two cases below the 
Spanish average), their rejection of further decentralisation as well as 
a tendency to favour a regression in the decentralisation process as an 
alternative to the status quo: they all score high in both centralism 
and status-quo-minus and, even more signifi cantly, for the fi rst time 
in 30 years, options for regression score either higher than the status 
quo (Aragon and Castilla y León) or are very close to it. All of them 
display negative rates of growth for the status quo and status-quo-
plus options and positive ones for centralism. Surprisingly, this group 
includes four autonomous communities that carried out their own 
processes to reform their statutes of autonomy (Aragon, Castile and 
León, the Valencian Community and Castilla-La Mancha), which leads 
one to think that these reforms were not only elite-generated but had 
no social support at all, rather social rejection.
These three groups are quite coherent with statistically-signifi -
cant results coming from Figure 4. Figure 4 shows how far apart citizens’ 
perceived level of decentralisation (measured in a 0-10 scale in which 0 
is maximum centralism and 10 is maximum decentralisation) is from cit-
izens’ expectations of how much centralised-decentralised the system 
should be. Accordingly, values around 0 show satisfaction with the cur-
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rent level of decentralisation (accommodation between perceived and 
wished level); positive values refer to claims for further decentralisa-
tion, and negative values refer to centralist attitudes. Figure 4 also 
shows the Spanish average mean and median. In this sense, it is inter-
esting to note that fi rstly both the Spanish’s average mean and me-
dian score negatively, and, secondly, that in all but four autonomous 
communities (the Basque Country, Catalonia, Navarre and the Balearic 
Islands), citizens’ satisfaction towards the perceived level of decen-
tralisation is negative. Thus, both aspects point out that with the ex-
ception of citizens from the four above-mentioned autonomous com-
munities, citizens’ perceptions of the degree of decentralisation are 
negative since they would rather prefer a less decentralised system.
Figure 4. Satisfaction with the perceived level of self-government. 2010
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From Figure 4 four statistically-signifi cant groups can be distin-
guished: Group 1 is composed of three autonomous communities 
whose citizens’ preferences on how decentralised the system should 
be do not match with their perceptions on how decentralised the 
system is. In other words, they think the levels of self-government 
are insuffi cient. This group is composed of the Basque Country, Cata-
lonia and Navarre. Group 2 is composed of autonomous communities 
whose averages are close to and a little higher than Spain’s state-
wide average mean. Citizens from these autonomous communities 
would prefer a rather less decentralised system but, even though, 
they are satisfi ed with the current system. The group embraces Gali-
cia, Canary Islands and Andalusia. Group 3, the largest group, is com-
posed of autonomous communities whose averages are close to but 
below Spain’s average mean and median. Citizens from these auton-
omous communities accept the current system despite their prefer-
ence for a less decentralised and, therefore, a more centralist system 
(Valencian Community, La Rioja, Cantabria and Asturias). Finally, 
Group 4 is composed of autonomous communities whose citizens 
perceive that the current system is more decentralised than what 
they would like it to be (their average means are lower than Spain’s 
average mean). Therefore, they show a rather clear preference for a 
less decentralised political system in which the autonomous commu-
nities would lose powers. The autonomous communities that are 
part of this group are Madrid, Aragon, Murcia, Castile and León and 
Extremadura. With the exception of Madrid and Murcia, the other 
three autonomous communities initiated their respective processes 
of self-government reform. In this sense and again, it could be said 
that the self-government reforms carried out in these autonomous 
communities had little social support and, thus, were rather promot-
ed by their respective political elites as a political reaction regarding 
other processes of reform.
To sum up, between 1992 and 2010, self-government reforms 
have been accompanied by changes in citizens’ preferences and sup-
port for the territorial organisation model. In the majority of cases 
these changes have merely accentuated existing trends, whether they 
were trends towards a regression in the decentralisation model or 
tervals at 95% for the differential mean of each Autonomous Community. 95% of confi -
dence entails a 95 out of 100 of certitude that the true value of the mean is located be-
tween the two extremes of the bar. Therefore, overlapping error bars do not entail 
statistically signifi cant differences.
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towards further development of the decentralisation process and, as 
a consequence, have mostly affected support for the status quo op-
tion which, in general, has fallen dramatically. Thus, an interesting 
conclusion is that since self-government reforms took place, citizens’ 
attachment to the status quo has changed. Two very different rea-
sons may account for such a change: because the status quo may be 
perceived as a completely outdated model for those aiming at fur-
ther decentralisation, and because the status quo, since it has allowed 
further development of the decentralisation process, may be per-
ceived as the seed of unwanted change and, thus, involution is pre-
ferred. In short: simultaneously with the beginning of the bottom-up 
process to reform the statutes of autonomy, the status quo option 
seems to have been questioned, for different reasons, in several au-
tonomous communities. In some of them, such questioning is not 
new: it is related to their unsatisfi ed aims for further decentralisation 
and their frustration with the current system and reforms. Reforms 
might have accelerated trends. In some others, such questioning is 
quite a novelty and could be related to the opposite situation: the 
status quo no longer seems to be the most popular base for the po-
litical system and involution has clearly appeared for the fi rst time 
since the system was established. However, and assuming that such 
simultaneous events imply a relationship between reforms and 
changes in support for the status quo, they do not always seem to 
have resulted in the questioning of the system. Thus, in some autono-
mous communities citizens’ positive perceptions towards the status 
quo do not seem to have changed signifi cantly, at least in terms of 
perceptions. In other words and in spite of all the political turmoil 
generated by the reforms, citizens from some autonomous communi-
ties kept their loyalty towards the status quo although, in general, 
without being particularly in favour of further decentralisation 
changes. In any case the political scenario reveals a complex situation 
which is diffi cult to resolve unless asymmetries are not only allowed 
but also, and even more importantly, political elites understand that 
the copycat behaviour which has characterised the Spanish decen-
tralisation process must end.
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ABSTRACT
This article explores the changes that have taken place in public opinion 
preferences with respect to the model of political organisation in Spain fol-
lowing the last wave of statutory reforms. The article is based on data col-
lected from surveys carried out by the Centre for Sociological Research be-
tween 2002 and 2010 and aims primarily to detecting the extent to which 
the preference for a model of decentralisation, such as that which currently 
exists (and which is referred to as the “status quo” throughout the article) 
has undergone major changes during the period of analysis, and in which 
autonomous communities. The article concludes that simultaneous to the 
statutory reforms there have been major changes in public perception of 
the “institutional goodwill” that exists in the current institutional model of 
decentralisation and self-government. Specifi cally, while some communities 
under the current model have begun to question why it cannot adapt to 
some of the more ambitious expectations of self-government, in other com-
munities the present model has been questioned precisely for the opposite 
reason: to understand why the current model of political decentralisation 
has gone too far. So for the fi rst time in some of the autonomous commu-
nities the preference for self-government involution (i.e., preference for cen-
tralism and cuts in self-government powers) is greater than that expressed 
in the current decentralisation model. 
Key words: statutory reforms; model of regional organisation; public opinion; 
Centre for Sociological Research; self-government.
RESUM
Aquest article explora els canvis que s’han produït en les preferències dels 
ciutadans respecte del model d’organització territorial de l’Estat espanyol 
d’ençà de la darrera onada de reformes estatutàries. Fonamentat en dades 
d’enquestes dutes a terme pel Centre d’Investigacions Sociològiques entre 
2002 i 2010, l’article se centra a detectar fi ns a quin punt i en quines comu-
nitats autònomes la preferència per un model de descentralització com 
l’actual (el que s’anomena statu quo a l’article) ha sofert canvis al llarg del 
període. L’article conclou que simultàniament a les reformes estatutàries, hi 
ha hagut canvis importants en la percepció que tenen els ciutadans respecte 
de la “bondat institucional” de l’actual model de descentralització autonò-
mica. En concret, mentre en algunes comunitats autònomes el model actual 
s’ha començat a qüestionar per entendre’s que no permet acomodar unes 
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expectatives més ambicioses d’autogovern, en d’altres comunitats el model 
actual s’ha qüestionat just pel contrari: per entendre’s que el model de des-
centralització ha anat massa lluny. Així, en algunes comunitats i per primer 
cop, les preferències envers una involució autonòmica (centralisme i reta-
llada de competències autonòmiques) superen les adreçades al model ac-
tual de descentralització.
Paraules clau: reformes estatutàries; model d’organització territorial; opi-
nió pública; Centre d’Investigacions Sociològiques; autogovern.
RESUMEN
El artículo explora los cambios que se han producido en las preferencias de 
los ciudadanos respecto el modelo de organización territorial del estado 
español a partir de la última ola de reformas estatutarias. El artículo se fun-
damenta en datos de encuestas realizadas por el Centro de Investigaciones 
Sociológicas entre 2002 y 2010 y está centrado en detectar hasta qué punto 
y en qué comunidades autónomas, la preferencia por un modelo de descen-
tralización como el actual (lo que a lo largo del artículo se denomina “statu 
quo”) ha sufrido cambios importantes durante el período de análisis. El ar-
tículo concluye que simultáneamente a las reformas estatutarias se han pro-
ducido cambios importantes en la percepción que los ciudadanos tienen de 
la “bondad institucional” del actual modelo de descentralización autonómi-
ca. En concreto, mientras que en algunas comunidades el actual modelo se 
ha empezado a cuestionar por entender que no permite acomodar unas 
expectativas más ambiciosas de autogobierno, en otras comunidades el mo-
delo actual se ha cuestionado precisamente por lo contrario: por entender-
se que el modelo actual de descentralización política ha ido demasiado le-
jos. Así, por primera vez en algunas comunidades las preferencias hacia una 
involución autonómica (centralismo y recorte de las competencias autonó-
micas) superan a las del actual modelo de descentralización. 
Palabras clave: reformas estatutarias; modelo de organización territorial; 
opinión pública; Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas; autogobierno.
